one, since it looks at philosophical questions from a sociological point of view, and empirical questions from a normative point of view. This is why, every so often I think of David Hume, who would be turning in his grave if he could hear one of my conferences or read one of my articles.
For me, however, it is not a question of deriving normative consequences from the 'nature of the thing,' but of arguing, while respecting the 'coherence' of the thing. Someone might think -and they may be right -that at the end of the day, there is not a great difference between the two ways of proceeding.
However, since, I am influenced by the system theory of Niklas Luhmann, I know that the normative consequences that I derive, whilst taking the 'thing' seriously, are not necessary but contingent consequences: I may derive them in one way, but they could also be derived differently.
For example, for me the pluralist and multicultural society is not only a mere fact, but also a value, which must be preserved. For someone else, however, it could be without doubt a fact, and yet one that must be disputed and changed, namely, a disvalue instead of a value. Thus, whilst starting from a normative position, my intention here is to produce a good argument about 'Legal pluralism and problems of legal application,' as opposed to an argument the validity of which hold with necessity.
First of all, the entire position of the problem must be contextualised: In my opinion, the question should be asked from the perspective of someone who finds herself in the situation we live in, which is that of a society not only pluralist, but also multicultural, and so characterised by substantial migratory phenomena that will see migrants to constitute ethnic-cultural minorities in the hosting society more often than not.
The notion of a 'multicultural society' is a sociological and empirical one. On the legal side, it corresponds to an 'experienced' normative pluralism, and not simply a theoretical normative pluralism.
1 From the empirical point of view, a monistic concept of law, understood as a system of catholic marriage and customs govern the cohabitation of common law spouses. be compatible with the formulation of a legal system as a unitary and general system' (225), but then specifies that the legal system, in order to take into account the pluralist social situation 'becomes a system based on plurality' (226f), which may 'justify differentiated legal treatments' (228, see also 231). In fact, 'when it is a question of basic requirements which affect necessities, needs, the material condition of the individuals, [it is] indispensible to return to unity: unity of the system, which however does not mean unitariness of the legal system' (232). With the term 'system' the author means here not simply a set of legal rules (legal order), but also jurisdiction as the institution of the application of the rules. Having summarised my position, I can now develop my argument.
II.
The guiding principle of my remarks is the principle of non-discrimination, which is contained in art. 3 of the Italian Constitution of 1948. The first comma of this article reads thus:
All citizens have equal social dignity and are equal before the law, without distinction on the grounds of gender, race, language, religion, political opinion or personal or social conditions.'
This principle is connected to the identity and dignity of the person, because non-discrimination is the other face of equality. Thus, as Giuseppe Zaccaria notices, it consists 'of allowing all members of society to give themselves a cultural identity.' 6 We are formally equal, despite our differences. In a legal sense, the recognition of identity and the rights pertaining to a person constitute human dignity. 7 A person is subject to discrimination, and so is offended in her dignity and humility, 8 if the legal system does not allow her to lead a lifestyle that she has chosen, possibly in contrast with specific fundamental rights, and she regards as reflecting an existential plan consistent with her own religious, moral and traditional values.
Consequently, with regard to the 'fact' of the diversity of the person, there exists a genuine right to pluralism, in which the personal differences of 'gender, race, language, religion, political opinions,' etcetera, are respected. 9 This is why, I believe, it is right to take questions concerning multicultural identity seriously. In other words, not the normative universe but rather the normative pluriverse 10 has to face in a situation of legal pluralism. Thus, I maintain that these questions can be neither decided by strictly applying State Law, nor simply treated according to the tolerance principle, which tend to merely allow for a modus vivendi, 11 and so does not genuinely recognise the rights and identity of a person. Related, I claim that these questions should be dealt with from a negotiating point of view 12 or -better still -in accordance with practises of settlement or 'accommodation.' The latter consists of 'practises through which the law, or social actors operating in its shadow, are sensitive to, take into account and make room for values and meanings which differ from their own.'
13
The reason supporting my view is that the typical relevant courses of conduct I am referring toconsider, for example, the cases of polygamous marriage, displaying of religious symbols, following of certain food rules, wearing certain types of clothing, practising particular rituals, following a particular school education -are (very often) prescribed by institutional rules. These rules arise within those which Robert Cover has defined 'nomoi groups.' 14 These are 'jurisgenetic' groups, i.e., they produce law for those who belong to them. This law is justified and interpreted from within narratives and founding myths that are contained in the most diverse 'texts,' such as sacred scriptures, epic poems, tragedies, comedies, constitutional acts, etcetera. On this basis, the groups successfully protect their own collective identity and effectively control the behaviour of those who belong to them.
These groups are cultural communities, whose norms constitute institutions which are legitimized by the fundamental values of the community, and so they obtain great consensus. be incompatible with the principles and the rules of the official legal system of the host society 16 .
Thus, we must both take the institutional rules of these minorities seriously and must not underestimate their normative force and their effectiveness. This means to also treat the people who follow them with 'equal concern and respect,' i.e., in accordance with the principle of nondiscrimination. According to Ronald Dworkin, 'no self-respecting person who believes that a particular way to live is most valuable for him can accept that this way of life is base or degrading.' 17 In fact, culture possesses an existential meaning for any human being, and thus it becomes difficult to legitimately and successfully criticise the institutions of others as unreasonable, unworthy or wrong by taking up an external, detached, 'objective' point of view. One point must be held firm: the institutions of the minority groups propose some patterns of behaviour that are just as worthy as those proposed by our institutions. According to the phenomenon of the reactive culturalism, it is not only highly unlikely but also arguably unjust that their practices may be overruled, or even effectively opposed, via measures of legal repression.
The institutional answers may be the most diverse, and may range from the French 'universalist model,' statist and assimilationist, which simply deny the problem, to the Canadian 'particularist model,' shaped by jurisdictional pluralism. 21 The particularist model, proposes a millet system, in which the single communities -and in particular those organised on a religious basis -have independent and sometimes exclusive jurisdiction, for matters which concern their collective identity -in particular, the personal statute, family law and law of succession - governance, is that it gives too much importance to the community and its presumed collective identity, so that this solution promotes the conception which sees society as an archipelago of cultural islands, almost separated from society as a whole, within which collective rights are recognized 25 .
On the contrary, I move from a secular and personalist point of view. From this perspective, communities and cultures -despite the important meaning they carry for people -can only be protected indirectly, via the guarantees provided to human beings by the State system.
In order to settle multicultural legal conflicts, in general, and those in which women -very often as the offended or discriminated parties (especially in a family environment 26 ) -are implied in particular, the solution I would propose is that of promoting -according to Denise Réaume -'culturally sensitive jurisdiction.' 27 In reality, this should concern a judicial activity which pronounces decisions 'sensitive' not only for the cultural minority in question, but for all the cultures in play -the minority one and also the majority or 'official' one. the court must pay appropriate regard to these differences.'
30
With regard to cultural diversity both the paternalism of those who want to teach and impose on others how they should behave, and also the indulgence however tolerant of diversity are counterproductive. 31 Rather, the judicial activity itself should be formed as momentum for the respectful criticism of the foreign practices and institutions, which are followed in a society different from their original one. This may mean that the judge, in searching for an appropriate solution, reflects the normative pluralism, according to a quasi rule-producing decision-making strategy. In this model, in applying the law the judge takes into consideration both foreign rules, and principles and norms of her own legal system, in order to 'put together' a new rule, a hybrid of the norms and principles of the systems considered.
Legally, belonging to a cultural group cannot be conceived as an ascriptive status (by force), nor should the cultural choice of an individual weigh on an individual like a sentence. On the contrary, the elective nature of these aspects should be fully recognised (by will), so that people must be able to benefit from the guarantees provided by the legal system of the country in which they live, even if they have initially chosen a traditional way of life, which does not foresee that kind of protections 32 and despite any existence of specific group rights.
III.
The rise of the hard cases is indicative of the problem of the 'unhappy' integration 33 of the person, which can happen on two distinct levels: that of integration in their own group (which can imply also only minimal integration into the society as a whole: for example, the married woman in a polygamous marriage who accepts her own condition); and that of the inclusion in the host society (which implies a centrifugal integration with regard to their own group: for example, the woman cast out from her group who turns to the protection of the State legal system in order to improve her own personal economic conditions). The passage from one integrative form to the other is made possible by the so called 'right to exit,' that is, by a person's freedom to leave their own group, which sparks off the general protection of the State legal system. The protection of the legal system, though, does not intervene only in the case of definitive abandonment by a person of their own culture and group, but also in the instance of even only a partial or temporary distancing.
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Furthermore, as far as the legal protection of these people is concerned, those who are different even with regard to the minority group they belong to, the most appropriate procedure may not be 33 'Unhappiness' means having to choose the second best option: That for which in the difference (which requires as a principle of justice that equal cases are treated equally and different cases are treated differently) we resort to the principle of formal equality (according to which all people are equal in the eyes of the law) and to the legal provisions, but in respect of the initial difference, as required by the principle of human dignity. On the concept of 'happy/unhappy integration' see Gianfrancesco Zanetti, Political Friendship and the Good Life (Kluwer, The Hague 2002). 34 However, the right to exit may provide a guarantee only prima facie, since that which the dissident is faced with is often solely a dramatic situation in which the woman finds herself doubly discriminated against -in her community and in society at large -and in the impossibility of surviving outside the oppressive relations which govern the community life.
that which ends in an authoritative decision like that of the judge, but a settlement which tries to mediate between the parties involved. 35 In fact, in questions in which women are implied in the vast majority of cases, such as conjugal ones (divorce, repudiation) or familiar ones (custody of children, home authority, heredity), or in those that are directly opposed to their community, 36 they risk losing out in every case: If the State judge recognises their just rights, they are marginalised or expelled from the group; if they lose the case they are forced to continue being subject to mistreatment. In these cases -of which real examples can be found, for example, in the protection of the right to physical integrity against the danger of being subject to a genital mutilation -some authors formulate the hypothesis that it is better to find a compromise solution which safeguards both traditional rules and customs, and women's rights, but without making them run the risk of no longer being accepted by their group. 37 Finally, the solution to these hard cases requires that the reconstruction of the case and the identification and interpretation of the norms happen in a -Weberian -'understanding' way, which is informed to the principles of equal consideration and respect, and cultural pluralism. 38 So, the action ruled by institutional norms should be understood as based on the intention of the actor, according to the 'presumption' of the value of the institution in question, it should be judged according to constitutional principles. For example, on one hand, in consideration of the respect of the foreign culture and pluralism, this could lead to the recognition of polygamous marriage celebrated within the community, despite conflict with the principle of moral and legal equality between spouses (art. 29, par. 2 It. Const.); on the other hand, it implies that -in order to respect personal dignity -criticism of the institution by jurisdictional means, which, in the case of conflict between spouses, grants protection to the weaker party -the woman -with regard to separation and divorce, support, custody of the children, etc., through the application of articles 3 and 29 of the It.
